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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)G)(2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Has plaintiff properly marshaled the evidence in support of the trial court's 
ruling? 
Standard of Review: The appealing party has the burden of marshaling the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then showing that it is insufficient. Fitz v. Synthes 
(USA), 1999 UT 103, H 8, 990 P.2d 391. If an appellant fails to properly marshal the 
evidence, appellate courts must assume the findings are correct, and the appeal fails. 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998); Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 
434 (Utah 1998); Scharfv. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); West Valley 
City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
2. Did the trial court err in ruling that plaintiff and Lagoon entered into a valid 
settlement agreement? 
Standard of Review: The issue of whether an oral contract or agreement exists 
presents questions of both law and fact. In re Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17, ^ f 27, 71 P.3d 
589. "Whether a contract has been formed is ultimately a conclusion of law, but that 
ordinarily depends on the resolution of subsidiary issues of fact." Id. (citing Nunley v. 
Westates Casing Serv.f Inc., 1999 UT 100,117, 989 P.2d 1077). The appellate court will 
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defer to the trial court's factual findings and will not set them aside unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Reliance Ins. Co. v. UtahDep't of"Transp., 858 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 1993). 
A trial court's finding of fact is not clearly erroneous unless it is against the clear weight 
of the evidence or the appellate court reaches a definite and clear conclusion that a 
mistake has been made. Dep't of Human Serv. v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 682 (Utah 
1997). 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by enforcing the settlement 
agreement between plaintiff and Lagoon? 
Standard of Review: The decision of a trial court to summarily enforce a 
settlement agreement will not be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that there was an 
abuse of discretion. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 942 n. 11 (Utah 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about April 6, 2004, plaintiff Jillene Barnes ("plaintiff) filed this lawsuit, 
asserting a claim of negligence against Lagoon Corporation, Inc. ("Lagoon"). R. at 1-4. 
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she was injured while on a water slide at Lagoon 
on July 1, 2000 and incurred over $21,000 in special damages as a result of those injuries. 
R. at 2-3. 
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On May 21, 2004, Lagoon filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement with 
accompanying memorandum and affidavits, arguing that before filing suit plaintiff 
entered into an enforceable settlement agreement with Lagoon. R. at 15-51. On August 
4, 2004, plaintiff filed her Memorandum in Opposition with accompanying affidavit. R. 
at 52-62. In her affidavit, plaintiff claims to have incurred in excess of $50,000 in special 
damages. R. at 60-61. On August 31, 2004, Lagoon filed a Reply Memorandum in 
Support of its Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. R. at 63-73. 
On November 22, 2004, the trial court held a hearing on Lagoon's Motion to 
Enforce Settlement Agreement and heard oral argument from both parties. R. at 80-81, 
102. After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court granted Lagoon's motion 
and held that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement agreement. The ruling is 
dated December 8, 2004. R. at 82-88, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
As part of its ruling, the trial court ordered Lagoon to reissue a check to plaintiff 
for the full amount of $2,500 within thirty days and also ordered plaintiff to execute and 
deliver to Lagoon a release within two weeks of receipt of the check. R. at 82. On 
December 22, 2004, Lagoon mailed a $2,500 check to plaintiffs counsel, R. at 93-94, 
however, Plaintiff refused to accept the check. 
On January 31, 2005, the trial court entered a final order, dismissing plaintiffs 
Complaint with prejudice. R. at 89-97, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
On March 2, 2005, plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal. R. at 98-99. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This is an action for negligence concerning injuries that plaintiff allegedly 
sustained while a patron of Lagoon. (R. at 2-3.) 
2. On July 1, 2000, plaintiff claims that she was injured while on a waterslide 
at Lagoon. Plaintiff alleges that before she reached the bottom of the waterslide another 
patron struck her from behind, causing serious and permanent injury (the "Incident"). 
Plaintiff contends that the other patron entered the slide at the direction of a Lagoon 
employee. (R. at 2-3.) 
3. On My 7, 2000, plaintiff contacted Lagoon concerning the Incident and her 
alleged injuries. Plaintiff inquired as to whether Lagoon would pay for the medical 
expenses that allegedly resulted from the Incident. (R. at 27, 30, 59-60.) 
4. On October 4, 2000, plaintiff mailed a letter to Lagoon containing her 
account of the Incident and detailing her medical expenses ($1,641) that allegedly 
resulted from the Incident, stating that she was "...anxious to resolve this [claim]." (R. at 
33-36, 83.) 
5. On October 10, 2000, R.C. Fussner contacted plaintiff on behalf of Lagoon 
concerning her letter and her alleged injuries from the Incident. Mr. Fussner offered 
plaintiff $2,000 to settle any claims arising out of the Incident. Plaintiff accepted 
Lagoon's offer and agreed to execute a release. The following day, Mr. Fussner mailed 
plaintiff a $2,000 check and an accompanying release. (R. at 39, 42, 45-46, 83-86.) 
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6. On October 20, 2000, plaintiff contacted Mr. Fussner and indicated that she 
now considered $2,000 to be insufficient. Instead, plaintiff stated that $5,000 would be 
an acceptable amount. (R. at 39, 42, 60, 83.) 
7. On October 23, 2000, Mr. Fussner contacted plaintiff in response to her 
demand. Instead of seeking to enforce the original agreement, Mr. Fussner offered 
plaintiff an additional $500 to once again settle any claims arising out of the 
Incident-$2,500 in total. Plaintiff accepted Lagoon's offer as full and complete 
satisfaction of her claims against Lagoon. (R. at 39-40, 43, 60, 72, 83-86.) 
8. Because Lagoon had already mailed plaintiff a check in the amount of 
$2,000 and an accompanying release, the parties agreed that Lagoon would send plaintiff 
the remaining $500 once it had received a copy of the executed release from plaintiff. (R. 
at 40, 43, 60, 83-86.) 
9. Despite the agreement, plaintiff never mailed a copy of the executed release 
to Lagoon or deposited the $2,000 check. Lagoon did not hear from plaintiff until it 
received a letter on February 1, 2001 from an attorney in Idaho, Greg Maeser, who 
purported to represent plaintiff. (R. at 40, 83.) 
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10. Lagoon's counsel notified Mr. Maeser that plaintiff had personally reached 
a settlement agreement with Lagoon and that Lagoon intended to hold plaintiff to that 
agreement.1 (R. at 48.) 
11. Plaintiff later retained local counsel, Daniel Bertch, who contacted 
Lagoon's counsel to negotiate a possible settlement. Mr. Bertch argued that "[plaintiff] 
could not cash the $2,000 check, because in so doing, she would settle for less than the 
$2,500 agreed upon," and also claimed that "...Lagoon has failed to perform the 
settlement." (R. at 72.) 
12. As before, Lagoon's counsel notified Mr. Bertch that plaintiff had 
personally reached a settlement agreement with Lagoon and that Lagoon intended to hold 
plaintiff to that agreement. (R. at 50-51.) 
13. Plaintiff ignored the enforceable settlement agreement and brought suit 
against Lagoon on April 6, 2004. (R. a1 1-4.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case involves a straight forward application of Utah law concerning oral 
agreements. After reviewing the evidence, the trial court properly concluded that plaintiff 
entered into an enforceable settlement agreement with Lagoon. In light of the factual 
findings of the trial court, the record demonstrates that plaintiff engaged Lagoon in 
'In her opening brief, plaintiff disclosed that "[b]ecause Mr. Maeser and present 
counsel did not agree that there was an enforceable settlement agreement, this action was 
filed." Appellant Brief at 4. 
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negotiations with the intent of reaching a settlement, that plaintiff deliberatively and 
carefully negotiated her claims with Lagoon, and that plaintiff agreed to settle any claims 
stemming from the Incident against Lagoon in exchange for $2,500.2 
The settlement agreement between plaintiff and Lagoon remains enforceable 
regardless of the fact that plaintiff was not represented by counsel, that plaintiff did not 
cash the $2,000 check, that plaintiff did not execute the release, and that Lagoon did not 
send plaintiff a $500 check. Accordingly, the Court should affirm the ruling of the trial 
court and hold that plaintiff entered into an enforceable settlement agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROPERLY 
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
The trial court's decision in this matter, while not complex, involved a fact 
intensive analysis. See In re Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17, ^ f 27, 71 P.3d 589 (determining 
whether an oral contract or agreement exists presents questions of both law and fact). It 
is well established that in order to successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on 
appeal, "[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support 
2In fact, plaintiff entered into an enforceable settlement agreement on two 
occasions. The original agreement was reached when plaintiff accepted Lagoon's offer 
for $2,000. Instead of seeking to enforce that agreement, however, Lagoon agreed to pay 
plaintiff an additional $500 in an effort to resolve the matter. Lagoon will only address 
the existence and enforceability of the $2,500 settlement agreement. 
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as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.5" 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). 
An appellant cannot avoid its duty to marshal the evidence simply by labeling fact 
sensitive issues as legal issues. In Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 100 P.3d 1177, the Utah 
Supreme Court recently held: 
If the application of the standard is extremely fact sensitive, then the 
reviewing court should generally give the trial court considerable discretion 
in determining whether the facts of a particular case come within the 
established rule of law. Even where the defendants purport to challenge 
only the legal ruling, as here, if a determination of the correctness of a 
court's application of a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive, the 
defendants also have a duty to marshal the evidence. 
Id. at f^ 20 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) 
When a party fails to marshal the evidence supporting a challenged factual finding, 
the court rejects the challenge as "nothing more than an attempt to reargue the case before 
[the appellate] court." ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah). 
Thus, the appellate court "'assumes that the record supports the findings of the 
trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of 
law and the application of that law in the case.'" Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 
307, 312 (Utah 1997) (quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991)). 
Accordingly, when an appellant fails to marshal the evidence, its appeal fails and must be 
rejected. See, e.g., Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 434 (Utah 1998); Scharfv. BMG Corp., 
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700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 
1313 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). 
In the present case, instead of properly marshaling the evidence, plaintiff recites 
each party's version of the facts as presented before the trial court. Appellant Brief at 2-
5. By doing so, plaintiff completely ignores the ruling of the trial court and attempts to 
reargue the case to the appellate court. Plaintiffs failure to properly marshal the evidence 
is a sufficient basis alone to reject its appeal and affirm the decision of the trial court. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT PLAINTIFF 
ENTERED INTO AN ENFORCEABLE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT WITH LAGOON. 
The issue of whether an oral contract or agreement exists presents questions of 
both law and fact. In re Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17, \ 27, 71 P.3d 589. "Whether a 
contract has been formed is ultimately a conclusion of law, but that ordinarily depends on 
the resolution of subsidiary issues of fact." Id. (citing M/ft/ey v. Westates Casing Serv., 
Inc., 1999 UT 100, \ 17, 989 P.2d 1077). 
While the appellate court does not defer to the trial court's legal conclusions in 
reviewing them for correctness, it does defer to the trial court's factual findings and will 
not set them aside unless they are clearly erroneous. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dep 't of 
Transp., 858 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah 1993). A trial court's finding of fact is not clearly 
erroneous unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence or the appellate court 
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reaches a definite and clear conclusion that a mistake has been made. Dep 't of Human 
Serv. v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 682 (Utah 1997). 
Settlement agreements are favored by law and may be summarily enforced if there 
is a binding settlement agreement and the excuse for nonperformance is comparatively 
unsubstantial. Zions First Nat 7 Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478, 
479 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Settlement agreements are governed by the rules applied to 
general contract actions. Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311,312 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
It is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an 
agreement is essential to the formation of the contract. Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 
37, t 11, 78 P.3d 600; see also Golden Key Realty v. Manta, 699 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 
1985) (stating that essential elements of a contract include offer, acceptance, competent 
parties, and consideration). Additionally, the terms and conditions of an oral agreement 
must be sufficiently definite to allow it to be enforced. In re Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17, 
Tj 28, 71 P.3d589. 
In the present case, there is no question that Lagoon made an offer to settle the 
plaintiffs claims. As noted by the trial court, in response to the plaintiffs inquiry, 
Lagoon contacted plaintiff and offered her $2,500 to settle any claims arising out of the 
Incident. R. at 84; see DCMInv. Corp. v. Pinecrest Inv. Co., 2001 UT 91, Tf 12, 34 P.3d 
785 (a bona fide offer is one made in good faith which, on acceptance, would be a valid 
and binding contract). 
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Although plaintiff continues to deny it, the record demonstrates that she accepted 
Lagoon's offer. The trial court found that plaintiff "...intended to settle [her claims 
against Lagoon and] intended the terms of the settlement to include merely the expenses 
she had detailed because she was 'anxious to resolve' the matter." R. at 84-85. In fact, 
the trial court detailed the plaintiffs own statements that establish her acceptance of the 
offer. R. at 84-87. 
The trial court focused on a significant admission made by plaintiff in her 
affidavit. Specifically, plaintiff acknowledged that "[Lagoon] did not uphold their verbal 
agreement...I was never sent an additional $500...after [Lagoon] agreed to the $500." R. 
at 60, 85. Interestingly, plaintiffs counsel made a similar admission when he argued that 
"[plaintiff] could not cash the $2,000 check, because in so doing, she would settle for less 
than the $2,500 agreed upon," and also claimed that "...Lagoon has failed to perform the 
settlement." R. at 72 (emphasis added). 
Both admissions attempt to excuse plaintiff from honoring any claimed agreement 
by arguing that Lagoon did not perform its obligations. As concluded by the trial court, 
however, by arguing that Lagoon's non-performance excuses plaintiff from honoring the 
settlement agreement, plaintiff presumes and admits the existence of an underlying 
agreement. R. at 85-86. Without question, the plaintiffs conduct, her letter to Lagoon, 
her affidavit, and even her attorney's correspondence demonstrate plaintiffs intention to 
settle with Lagoon and the subsequent acceptance of
 its offer. 
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The record demonstrates that the terms and conditions of the agreement were clear 
to both parties-plaintiff agreed to settle any claims stemming from the Incident against 
Lagoon in exchange for $2,500. As stated by the trial court, "[i]n sum, the terms of the 
oral agreement are sufficiently definite to be enforced." R. at 86. 
There is no dispute that the settlement agreement between plaintiff and Lagoon 
satisfies the requirement for consideration. The trial court found that there was valid 
consideration for both parties. R. at 84. By releasing any claims against Lagoon arising 
from the Incident, plaintiff would receive $2,500. See Kraatz v. Heritage Imports, 2003 
UT App 201, Tf 40, 71 P.3d 188 (giving up value to which one is legally entitled 
constitutes sufficient consideration to support a contract). 
Plaintiff claims that an agreement was not reached because she did not receive a 
check for $500 from Lagoon. Appellant Brief at 8-10. Similarly, plaintiff also contends 
that, even if there was an oral agreement to settle for $2,500, Lagoon waited an 
unreasonable amount of time to tender the check. Id. Both arguments address the same 
issue, namely whether the fact that plaintiff did not receive the $500 check affected the 
settlement agreement. 
The trial court determined that the plaintiffs obligation to send Lagoon an 
executed release was a condition precedent to Lagoon sending plaintiff a $500 check. See 
Foster v. Montgomery, 2003 UT App 405, \ 23, 82 P.3d 191 ("[conditions precedent 
may be waived by the party in whose favor they are made"); Harper v. Great Salt Lake 
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Council, Inc., 1999 UT 34, ^ 14, 976 P.2d 1213 ("[fjailure of a material condition 
precedent relieves the obligor of any duty to perform"). Thus, the fact plaintiff did not 
send Lagoon an executed release excused Lagoon from sending the $500 check, but it did 
not negate the underlying settlement agreement. Furthermore, the trial court found that 
Lagoon did not wait an unreasonable amount of time, from October 2000 until February 
2001, without attempting to enforce the settlement agreement. R. at 86-87; see Brown v. 
Brown, 744 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Orme, J., dissenting) ("Parties have no 
right to welch on a settlement deal during the sometimes substantial period between when 
the deal is struck and when all necessary signatures can be garnered on a stipulation"). 
Plaintiff argues that an agreement was not reached because she did not cash the 
$2,000 check or execute a release. Such a position, however, is contrary to law. It is of 
no legal consequence that the parties have not signed a settlement agreement. 
Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Sys., Inc., 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Similarly, "[i]f a written agreement is intended to memorialize an oral contract, a 
subsequent failure to execute the written document does not nullify the oral contract." 
Lawrence Constr. Co. v. Holmquist, 642 P.2d 382, 384 (Utah 1982). "It is a basic and 
long-established principle of contract law that agreements are enforceable even though 
there is neither a written memorialization of that agreement nor the signatures of the 
parties...." Murray v. State, 131 P.2d 1000, 1001 (Utah 1987). Accordingly, the 
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settlement agreement between plaintiff and Lagoon was unaffected by the fact plaintiff 
did not cash a check or execute a release. 
In sum, plaintiff cannot show that the trial court's factual findings were against 
the clear weight of the evidence. The record demonstrates that plaintiff and Lagoon 
entered into an enforceable settlement agreement, and plaintiff does not have the right to 
renege on the agreement simply because she changed her mind. To allow such a result 
would undermine the policy of encouraging the voluntary settlement of disputes-and 
judicial efficiency at the same time-because either party could rescind an oral settlement 
agreement simply by changing their mind. Lagoon and similarly situated businesses 
would be unable to resolve minor claims if an individual could welch on an oral 
agreement before memorializing the settlement. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
SUMMARILY ENFORCING THE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND LAGOON 
WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
The decision of a trial court to summarily enforce a settlement agreement will not 
be reversed on appeal unless it is shown that there was an abuse of discretion. Mascaro v. 
Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 942 n. 11 (Utah 1987) (citing Millerberg v. Steadman, 645 P.2d 
602, 604 (Utah 1982). 
While plaintiff claims it was error for the trial court not to hold an evidentiary 
hearing, it is well established that a court may summarily enforce a settlement agreement 
without an evidentiary hearing when the case "...is not one in which complex factual 
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issues are presented." Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 609 
(Utah 1979). 
At the conclusion of oral argument on November 22, 2004, counsel for Lagoon 
suggested holding an evidentiary hearing to address any factual issues which remained 
surrounding the settlement agreement. R. at 81, 102. The trial court declined to hold the 
evidentiary hearing, suggesting that it believed the case to be one without complex factual 
issues. 
In fact, in its December 8, 2004 ruling, the trial court stated that "[a]fter reviewing 
the pleadings and supporting documents, and hearing oral arguments, it is apparent to the 
Court that the plaintiff entered into a valid settlement agreement." R. at 83-84. The 
"supporting documents" referred to by the trial court include the affidavit of plaintiff and 
Lagoon officials. These affidavits provided the trial court with sworn testimony of the 
events at issue and justified the trial court's decision not to have an evidentiary hearing, 
which would have only elicited similar testimony. 
The trial court's ruling and decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing demonstrate 
that the trial court clearly believed this case was uncomplicated factually and such a 
hearing was unnecessary. Therefore, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in 
summarily enforcing the settlement agreement between plaintiff and Lagoon. 
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CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the trial court's Ruling on Lagoon's Motion to Enforce 
Settlement Agreement and the trial court's Final Order, dismissing plaintiffs Complaint 
with prejudice, should be affirmed. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of September, 2005. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Brian P. Miller 
Sam Harkness 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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Exhibit A 
DEC 0 8 200* 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JILLENE BARNES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAGOON CORPORATION, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, and JOHN DOES I-V, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT LAGOON'S 
MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT 
Case No. 040700166 
Judge MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN 
This matter is before the Court on defendant Lagoon Corporation's Motion to Enforce 
Settlement Agreement. The Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers and heard 
oral arguments from attorneys for both parties. For the following reasons, the Court finds that 
the parties entered into an enforceable settlement agreement. The Court orders the defendant to 
reissue to the plaintiff a new check for the full amount of $2500 within thirty days of this Order 
and also orders the plaintiff to execute and deliver to the defendant a release in defendant's favor 
within two weeks of receipt of the check. 
BACKGROUND 
This concerns injuries the plaintiff allegedly sustained while a patron at the defendant's 
water slide. On July 1, 2000, the plaintiff was waiting to slide down the water slide while 
another patron waited to go down after her. At the defendant's employee's direction, the plaintiff 
began down the slide. Before the plaintiff reached the bottom of the slide, the patron who had 
been standing behind her at the top of the slide, collided with the plaintiff, sliding into her from 
behind. 
On July 7, 2000, the plaintiff phoned Lynette Small, defendant's employee in the Loss 
Prevention Office, and explained her allegations and claimed injuries. On October 4, 2000, 
about three months after calling the defendant, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant detailing 
her account of the events and injury-related expenses. On October 10, 2000, R.C. Fussner, 
defendant's Director of Loss Prevention, called the plaintiff after receiving a copy of her letter. 
The plaintiff and Mr. Fussner discussed the plaintiffs allegations and he offered to settle the 
matter for $2000 to which the plaintiff agreed. He stated he would send her a check for $2000 
and a release for her to execute. 
On October 20, 2000, however, the plaintiff called Mr. Fussner and stated that $2000 
would no longer be enough, but that $5000 would be acceptable. Despite the plaintiffs previous 
agreement to settle for $2000, Mr. Fussner offered an additional $500 to settle. The plaintiff 
accepted the additional $500, whereupon Mr. Fussner said he would send the additional $500 
upon receipt of her release. The plaintiff said she would sign the release and return a copy to 
him; she never cashed the $2000 check nor signed a release. The next contact the defendant had 
with the plaintiff was when her attorney contacted the defendant on February 1,2001. 
ANALYSIS 
A court may summarily enforce a settlement agreement without an evidentiary hearing. 
Tracy-Collins Bank & Trust Co. v. Travelstead, 592 P.2d 605, 609 (Utah 1979). After reviewing 
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the pleadings and supporting documents, and hearing oral arguments, it is apparent to the Court 
that the plaintiff entered into a valid settlement agreement. The defendant made an offer to settle 
the plaintiffs alleged claims, the plaintiff accepted the defendant's offer, there was valid 
consideration on the part of both parties, see Golden Key Realty v. Manta, 699 P.2d 730, 732 
(Utah 1985) (holding that essential elements of a valid contract include "offer and acceptance, 
competent parties, and consideration."), and the terms and conditions of their oral agreement 
were "sufficiently definite to allow it to be enforced." Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, fflf 28, 71 
P.3d 589. 
In his affidavit, Mr. Fussner affirms that when the plaintiff spoke with him, she expressed 
a desire to "resolve the matter quickly." He offered to settle all of her claims for $2000, to which 
the plaintiff agreed. Later, he offered an additional $500, despite the plaintiff having previously 
agreed to settle for $2000. He affirms that the plaintiff agreed to those terms-$2500 in exchange 
for a release of all of the plaintiffs claims allegedly arising from the July 1, 2000 incident. The 
parties' oral agreement has the essential elements of a binding settlement. 
The plaintiff claims that she did not agree to nor intend to settle for $2500 and that she 
merely agreed to "think about it." This claim is unlikely given the plaintiffs own statements. In 
her letter of October 4, 2000, she wrote: "I am asking that Lagoon cover my expenses for this 
preventable accident"; "I am submitting these bills to you in hope that we can resolve this 
matter"; and "I am anxious to resolve this. Please contact me " It is clear that the plaintiff 
intended to settle. Also, in her own affidavit, she contradicts her claims that she did not intend to 
settle. She first affirms that the defendant "kept steering the conversation to settling the claim on 
a final basis. This was never my intention when I first contacted Lagoon." She later states, 
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however, that "I offered to settle with Lagoon if they would agree to pay my expenses, including 
medical bills and loss of wages. This is what I wanted, was an agreement from Lagoon to pay 
these expenses" That is exactly what Lagoon agreed to pay. The October 4, 200 letter listed 
some $1,640.62 in expenses for doctors' bills, hospital and ambulance bills, x-ray bills, and 
amounts for her co-pays. She also included $893 for lost wages and clearly stated she was 
"anxious to resolve this." Her affidavit also shows she intended to and did settle. 
The plaintiff argues that the terms of the oral contract are not clear. She claims that when 
she stated she wanted the defendant to pay her "expenses, including medical bills", she meant 
not the limited amount she set forth in her letter, but all of her medical bills, including those 
which she incurred after October and those in the future. This, however, appears an incredible 
explanation. Her own attorney's letter shows she indeed settled for a sum at least near the 
$1,640.62 for which she asked. In his letter of March 10,2003 to Lagoon, he states that if the 
plaintiff had cashed the $2000 check, then "she would settle for less than the $2500 agreed 
upon" He states that she sought legal counsel because Lagoon "failed to perform the settlement. 
She assume[d] that Lagoon decided not to settle for $2500 . . . . " The plaintiffs own letter 
shows she intended the terms of the settlement to include merely the expenses she had detailed 
because she was "anxious to resolve" the matter. If she was anxious to resolve the matter, it 
seems reasonable that she would not want to drag out her dealings with the defendant by asking 
them to continually pay for her expenses. Finally, in her own affidavit, she admits that the 
defendant was to send a second check for $500, that it never sent the additional $500, and that 
Lagoon "did not uphold their verbal agreement", etc. The defendant argues, and the Court 
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agrees, that the defendant would not send-and the plaintiff would not expect, checks for $2000 
and $500 without there having been a clear and definite settlement agreement. 
It also seems apparent that the defendant was to send the additional $500 once it received 
the plaintiffs executed release. This was merely a condition precedent the parties set prior to the 
defendant assenting to a new contract with an additional $500; if the plaintiff did not follow 
through, then she would not get the extra $500 and stay with the original $2000. As it was a 
condition precedent in favor of the defendant, it could only be waived by the defendant. Foster 
v. Montgomery, 2003 UTApp 405, fflf 23, 82 P.3d 191. In sum, the terms of the oral agreement 
are sufficiently definite to be enforced. 
The plaintiff argues that she did not sign a release and so the contract is not binding. "[I]f 
a written agreement is intended to memorialize an oral contract," however, "a subsequent failure 
to execute the written document does not nullify the oral contract." Lawrence Constr.Co. v. 
Holmquist, 642 P.2d 382, 384 (Utah 1982). Also, the plaintiff argues that even if the Court finds 
that she was to send the release before the defendant was to send the additional $500, too long of 
a time has run to enforce the agreement. "Parties have no right," however, "to welch on a 
settlement deal during the sometimes substantial period between when the deal is struck and 
when all necessary signatures can be garnered on a stipulation." Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333, 
336 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Given the length of time that passed from the time of the accident to 
the first letter the plaintiff sent to the defendant, the fact that the defendant waited from mid-
October 2000 until the plaintiffs attorney contacted it in February 2001 for the plaintiffs release 
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does not seem like an unreasonable time to wait for the plaintiff to perform her side of the 
agreement. 
r 
Signed this December _ £ _ , 2004. 3L
)ISTRICT COURT JIJD|GE 
MICHAEL G. ALLP 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I sent a copy of the foregoing RULING ON DEFENDANT LAGOON'S 
MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT to the following, postage pre-paid, on 
December *7 ,2004: 
DANIEL F BERTCH 
BERTCHROBSON 
1996 EAST 6400 SOUTH SUITE 100 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84121 
BRIAN P MILLER 
SAM HARKNESS 
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE 11™ FLOOR 
POB 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145 
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Exhibit B 
BRIAN P. MILLER (6933) 
SAM HARKNESS (9448) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Lagoon Corporation, Inc. 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
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JAN 3 1 2005 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JILLENE BARNES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAGOON CORPORATION, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1 through 4, 
Defendants. 
FINAL ORDER 
Civil No. 040700166 
Judge Michael G. Allphin 
On November 22,2004, the Court held a hearing on Lagoon's Motion to Enforce 
Settlement. In addition to reviewing the moving and responding papers, the Court heard 
argument from counsel for Plaintiff and for Lagoon Corporation, Inc. ("Lagoon"). 
On December 8,2004, having been fully apprised of the relevant law and facts, the Court 
issued its Ruling on Defendant Lagoon's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. The Court 
Final Order 
granted Lagoon's motion, holding that Plaintiff and Lagoon entered into an enforceable 
settlement agreement. Accordingly, the Court ordered that Lagoon reissue a new check to 
Plaintiff for the full amount within thirty days of its Order and also ordered Plaintiff to execute 
and deliver to Lagoon a release in its favor within two weeks of receipt of the check. 
On December 22, 2004, Lagoon mailed a check to Plaintiffs counsel in the amount of 
$2,500 made payable to Plaintiff along with a Stipulation demonstrating Lagoon's compliance 
with the Court's decision. See Exhibit A. As Lagoon has fully complied with the Court's ruling, 
it is hereby 
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
DATED this day of January, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINAL ORDER was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this 4£^> day of January, 2005, to the following 
Daniel F. Bertch 
BERTCH ROBSON 
1996 East 6400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
A/f C/AtorY^' 
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Daniel Bertch 
Bertch Robson 
1996 East 6400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Re: Jillene Barnes v. Lagoon Corporation 
Dear Dan: 
Please find enclosed a check in the amount of $2,500.00 made payable to your client, 
Jillene Barnes. In addition, please find enclosed three original releases which are acceptable to 
Lagoon. Finally, please find enclosed a Stipulation Regarding Lagoon's Compliance with 
Court's December 3,2004 Order Related to Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement. Please 
sign the Stipulation and return it to me at your earliest convenience. I will then look forward to 
receiving two of the signed Releases or your indication that your client wishes to appeal this case. 
Please call if you have any questions. 
Very truly yours, 
SNOW, CHRISTI 
BPM:mhn 
Enclosure 
cc: R.C. Fussner 
N:\5433\254\Bertch-bpm-L06.wpd 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF. UTAH 
JILLENE BARNES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAGOON CORPORATION, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1 through 4, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION REGARDING 
LAGOON'S COMPLIANCE WITH 
COURT'S DECEMBER 3,2004 
ORDER RELATED TO MOTION TO 
ENFORCE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT 
Civil No. 040700166 
Judge Michael G. Allphin 
Counsel for Jileen Barnes, Daniel F. Bertch, hereby stipulates and agrees that Lagoon 
Corporation, Inc. has provided his client with a new check in the full amount of $2,500.00 within 
the thirty days required by this Court's Order related to Lagoon's Motion to Enforce Settlement 
Agreement. Lagoon has also provided plaintiff with a form of release acceptable to Lagoon. 
DATED this day of December, 2004. 
BERTCH&ROBSON 
By 
Daniel F. Bertch 
Attorneys for Jilleen Bames 
.? . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing STIPULATION 
REGARDING LAGOON'S COMPLIANCE WITH COURT'S DECEMBER 3,2004 
ORDER RELATED TO MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this day of December, 2004, to the following 
counsel of record: 
Daniel F. Bertch 
BERTCHROBSON 
1996 East 6400 South, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
N:\5433\254\PIeadings\Stip re Compliance Court's Order, wpd 
-3-
